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Multiple Nash-equilibrium in Quantum Game
Georgy Parfionov∗
Abstract
Methods of exploring Nash equilibrium in quantum games are studied.
Analytical conditions of the existence, the uniqueness or the multiplicity
of the equilibria are found.
Several aspects of an antagonistic game, with one of the parties demonstrat-
ing opportunism were studied in [1, 2, 3]. Since the opportunistic behavior is
enabled by quantum logic [4], a quantum version of the game was considered.
It was found that using quantum strategies rather than usual mixed ones can
augment the medium payoff of one of the players. However, in contrast with [5],
where this phenomenon is caused by entangled states, in [3] this effect is due to
the breach of distributivity.
In the first paper [1] quantum equilibrium was found approximately, using
methods of numeric simulation, which was an obstacle to study qualitative ef-
fects, and only in [3] some analytic approaches were put forward. The present
paper analysis the existence, the uniqueness and the multiplicity of Nash equi-
libria.
Quantum game. The analytic game considered in [1] reduces to the of the
pay-operator of the form
H = c3A1 ⊗B3 + c1A3 ⊗B1 + c4A2 ⊗B4 + c2A4 ⊗B2
where cj are non-negative numbers and Aj , Bk are self-adjoint operators in
Hilbert spaces HA, HB. These projectors correspond to pure strategies of the
players and satisfy the commutation relations
A1 +A3 = I = A2 +A4, A1A3 = A2A4 = 0, [A1A2] 6= 0
(1)
B1 +B3 = I = B2 +B4, B1B3 = B2B4 = 0, [B1B2] 6= 0
If the players use the quantum strategies ϕ ∈ HA, ψ ∈ HB, then the average
payoff of the first player is
〈H〉 = 〈ϕ⊗ ψ|H |ϕ⊗ ψ〉 = c3p1q3 + c1p3q1 + c4p2q4 + c2p4q2 (2)
where pj = 〈ϕ|Aj |ϕ〉, qk = 〈ψ|Bk|ψ〉 are the probability for the players to use
the pure strategies j, k.
∗Dept. of Mathematics, SPb. State University of Economics and Finances, Griboedova
30-32, 191023, St.Petersburg, Russia. e-mail: GogaParf@gmail.com, your@GP5574.spb.edu
1
The reduction of quantum game. In the model [1, 3], two-dimensional
real spaces HA, HB were used. In this case rkAj = rkBj = 1, therefore for
some rotations U(θ), U(τ) ∈ SO(2) the following relations hold
A2 = U
†(θ)A1 U(θ), B2 = U
†(τ)B1 U(τ), (0 < θ, τ <
pi
2
) (3)
The quantum strategies of the players were represented by the vectors on the
plane:
ϕ = (cosα, sinα), ψ = (cosβ, sinβ)
In this case the probabilities of pure strategies satisfy the equations
p1 = cos
2 α, p2 = cos
2(α− θ), q1 = cos
2 β, q2 = cos
2(β − τ) (4)
where θ, τ are angular parameters, related to the entangling relations (3).
Using the linea exchange of the variable
2p =Mθx+ e, 2q =Mτy + e
where
Mγ =
[
cos γ − sin γ
cos γ sin γ
]
, x =
[
x1
x2
]
, y =
[
y1
y2
]
, e =
[
1
1
]
the equations (4) read
x2
1
+ x2
2
= 1, y2
1
+ y2
2
= 1
So, each player chooses a point on the unit circle and the quantum game is
reduced to a classical one on a torus.
Denote, following [3]
a =
[
c1
c2
]
, b =
[
c3
c4
]
, ω = b − a, n = c1 + c3, m = c2 + c4, C =
[
n 0
0 m
]
A =M †θCMτ , u =M
†
θω, v =M
†
τω (5)
Then the average payoff (2) takes the form 4〈H〉 = g(x, y) + trC, where
g(x, y) = −〈x,Ay〉+ 〈x, u〉 − 〈v, y〉
Proposition 1. (The equilibrium criterion, see [3]) A pair of unit vectors (x, y)
forms a Nash equilibrium if and only if when nonnegative numbers λ, µ exist,
for which the following holds
−Ay + u = λx, A†x+ v = µy (6)
Proposition 2. (see [3]) If the equilibrium exists, then ω 6= 0.
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Eigenequilibria. An equilibrium (x, y) is called eigenequilibrium, if it is an
eigenvector of the matrix
A =
[
0 A
A† 0
]
Proposition 3. (see [3]) If the eigenequilibrium exists, then ω is a common
eigenvector of the matrices CMθM
†
θ , CMτM
†
τ .
A game is said to be non-degenerate, if
∆ =
∣∣∣∣ n mω21 ω22
∣∣∣∣ 6= 0 (7)
Proposition 4. (see [3]) If the game is non-degenerate, then the necessary con-
dition for the eigenequilibrium to exist is the coincidence of the angular param-
eters θ = τ . In this case their values are completely determined by the payoff
coefficients of the game {cj}:
cos 2θ = cos 2τ =
(m− n)ω1ω2
∆
(8)
Further finding eigenequilibria of non-degenerate games, calculate θ using (8)
and put M = Mθ, z = M
†ω. In this case A = A† = M †CM and the matrix A
nonnegatively defined. The equilibrium criterion (6) becomes simpler:
z −Ay = λx, z +Ax = µy (9)
Theorem 5. (First existence theorem) Let a vector ω be an eigenvector of the
matrix CMM † and 〈Az, z〉 6 |z|3. Then the strategies x = y = z/|z| form an
eigenequilibrium.
Proof. If CMM †ω = αω, then M †CMM †ω = αM †ω, that is, Az = αz. Since
the matrix A is symmetric, the vector (x, y) is an eigenvector of A. It remains
to check that it forms an equilibrium.
z −Ay = z − αy = z −
〈Az, z〉
|z|2
·
z
|z|
= (1 −
〈Az, z〉
|z|3
)|z| · x
z +Ax = z + αx = z +
〈Az, z〉
|z|2
·
z
|z|
= (1 +
〈Az, z〉
|z|3
)|z| · y
Since
(1−
〈Az, z〉
|z|3
)|z| > 0, (1 +
〈Az, z〉
|z|3
)|z| > 0
the sufficient conditions of the equilibrium are satisfied. 
Theorem 6. (Second existence theorem) Let a vector ω be an eigenvector of
the matrix CMM † and 〈Az, z〉 = |z|3. Then there are two eigenequilibria
x = y = z/|z|, x = −z/|z|, y = z/|z|.
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Proof. The first equilibrium was already obtained in the first theorem, and it
remains to prove that the second vector is also an equilibrium.
z −Ay = z − αy = z −
〈Az, z〉
|z|2
·
z
|z|
= (1−
〈Az, z〉
|z|3
)|z| · x = 0 · x
z +Ax = z + αx = z −
〈Az, z〉
|z|2
·
z
|z|
= (1−
〈Az, z〉
|z|3
)|z| · y = 0 · y
So, the sufficient conditions of the theorem are satisfied. 
Theorem 7. (Uniqueness theorem) Let there is a game with a non-degenerate
equilibrium 〈Az, z〉 6= |z|3. Then all possible equilibria are exhausted by it.
Proof. Let (a, b) be an arbitrary equilibrium, and (x, y) be an eigenequilibrium.
According to the well-known ‘rectangular’ property of antagonistic games, (a, y)
and (x, b) are also equilibria, furthermore, the value of the game is the same
in all these points. Since (x, y) is an eigenequilibrium, the vectors x, y are
proportional to z. It is trivially checked that there are only to possibilities for an
eigenequilibrium: x = y = z/|z| or x = −z/|z|, y = z/|z|. When x = y = z/|z|
we have
g(a, y) = −〈a,Ay〉+ 〈a, z〉 − 〈z, y〉 = (|z| − α)〈a, x〉 − |z|
Comparing it with
g(x, y) = −〈x,Ay〉+ 〈x, z〉 − 〈z, y〉 = −〈x, αx〉 = −α
we obtain (|z|−α)〈a, x〉−|z| = −α, hence (|z|−α)〈a, x〉 = |z|−α. The condition
α =
〈Az, z〉
|z|2
6= |z| (10)
implies 〈a, x〉 = 1. Since a and x are unit vectors, a = x.
Consider further
g(x, b) = −〈x,Ab〉+ 〈x, z〉 − 〈z, b〉 = −(|z|+ α)〈y, b〉+ |z|
and comparing it with g(x, y) = −α, we get −(|z|+ α)〈a, x〉 + |z| = −α, hence
(|z|+ α)〈y, b〉 = |z|+ α so y = b.
For the second candidate for the equilibrium x = −z/|z|, y = z/|z|We have
g(a, y) = −〈a,Ay〉+ 〈a, z〉 − 〈z, y〉 = (α− |z|)〈a, x〉 − |z|
Comparing it with
g(x, y) = −〈x,Ay〉+ 〈x, z〉 − 〈z, y〉 = α− 2|z|
we get (α− |z|)〈a, x〉 − |z| = α− 2|z|, hence (α− |z|)〈a, x〉 = α− |z|. From (10)
we have 〈a, x〉 = 1 therefore a = x. In a similar way we obtain b = y. 
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